Road to Mansarovar via Dharchula

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Amid LAC standoff, BRO moves heavy equipment to India-China border in Uttarakhand to build strategic road
India

PTI
PTI

Updated Jun 11, 2020 | 16:56 IST



The Munsiyari-Bogdiyar- Milam road, which is being constructed in the high Himalayan region of Johar Valley in the state's Pithoragarh district, will be a link to the last posts on the Indo-China border.

Representational Image


Representational Image | Photo Credit: IANS


Pithoragarh: Helicopters have landed heavy road-building machinery in the tough Himalayan terrain of Uttarakhand's Johar Valley to help speed up construction of the strategic Munsiyari-Bugdiyar-Milam road near the India-China border, an official said.
After several failed attempts in 2019, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) recently succeeded in carrying heavy road-building equipment by helicopters to Laspa, raising hopes of the road's faster completion, BRO Chief Engineer Bimal Goswami said.
The absence of heavy stone cutting equipment at Laspa near the alignment site of the 65-km road had delayed its construction. The Munsiyari-Bogdiyar- Milam road, which is being constructed in the high Himalayan region of Johar Valley in the state's Pithoragarh district, will be a link to the last posts on the Indo-China border.
After several unsuccessful attempts last year, we succeeded this month in landing helicopters carrying heavy machines to Laspa. We now hope that cutting work of the challenging stretch will be completed in the next three years, Goswami said.
Cutting of hard rocks, which are standing straight on a 22-km portion of the road, will now become easy as heavy machines can be transported by helicopters to the spot.
Construction of the road was started in 2010 with an amount of Rs 325 crore sanctioned for the project, the BRO chief engineer said. He said the road is being constructed from both ends and except the 22-km hard portion, cutting work has been completed on 40 km of the road.

Amid LAC standoff, BRO moves heavy equipment to India-China border in Uttarakhand to build strategic road
 

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Conflict of this issue is affecting other points / borders.



1 Indian killed, 4 injured in firing by Nepal police near border with
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•Jun 12, 2020


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At least one Indian was killed and four others were injured after Nepal police allegedly fired indiscriminately on them at the border near Sitamarhi district in Bihar on Friday, officials said.Sources said the firing took place after a clash between the Indians and personnel of Nepal police at the Lalbandi-Janki Nagar border in Pipra Parsain panchayat under Sonebarsha police station of the district.
 

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Firing on India-Nepal border, incident happened deep inside Nepalese Territory says SSB-DG

भारत-नेपाल सीमा पर फायरिंग, SSB के डीजी ने कहा- नेपाल क्षेत्र के अंदर हुई घटना, स्थिति सामान्य

Published By: Sudhir Jha | पीटीआई,नई दिल्ली
  • Last updated: Fri, 12 Jun 2020 03:48 PM





नेपाल के साथ नक्शा विवाद को लेकर चल रहे तनाव के बीच अब भारतीयों पर नेपाल पुलिस ने गोलीबारी की, जिसमें एक भारतीय नागरिक की मौत हो गई। झड़प किस बात को लेकर हुई, यह अभी पता नहीं चला है लेकिन आधिकारिक सूत्रों का कहना है कि यह झड़प नेपाल सीमा के काफी अंदर हुई है और अब स्थिति सामान्य है।
बिहार के सीतामढ़ी जिले के सोनबरसा क्षेत्र में जानकीनगर और नेपाल के नारायणपुर के बीच नेपाली पुलिस की गोलीबारी में तीन भारतीय घायल भी हुए हैं। एक अन्य को नेपाल पुलिस ने हिरासत में ले लिया है। सशस्त्र सीमा बल (एसएसबी) के डीजी कुमार राजेश चंद्र ने कहा है कि यह घटना नेपाल सीमा के काफी अंदर हुई है। उन्होंने कहा है कि स्थिति पूरी तरह सामान्य है।
अधिकारियों ने इस घटना में एक भारतीय की मौत और 2 अन्य के घायल होने की पुष्टि की है। हालांकि, हिन्दुस्तान को मिली खबर के मुताबिक, पांच लोगों पर फायरिंग की गई थी, जिसमें एक की मौत हो गई, तीन घायल हैं और लागन यादव (45) नाम के एक शख्स के नेपाल प्रहरी की हिरासत में होने की सूचना है। नेपाली पुलिस की गोली से मरने वाले भारतीय का नाम विकेश कुमार उर्फ विकास है। जख्मियों को अस्पताल में भर्ती कराया गया है।
नेपाली पुलिस का आरोप है कि भारतीय नागरिकों ने उनसे हथियार छीनने की कोशिश की थी। सस्त्र सीमा बल (एसएसबी) के डायरेक्टर जनरल कुमार राजेश चंद्र ने कहा कि घटना नेपाल सीमा के काफी भीतर सुबह 8:40 पर हुई। उन्होंने कहा, ''स्थिति पूरी तरह सामान्य है और हमारे स्थानीय कमांडर्स ने तुरंत नेपाली समकक्षों के साथ संपर्क स्थापित किया।''
उधर, सशस्त्र सीमा बल में पटना फ्रंटियर के महानिरीक्षक (आईजी) संजय कुमार ने बताया कि नेपाल के सशस्त्र पुलिस बल (एपीएफ) और स्थानीय लोगों के बीच यह घटना हुई। कुमार ने बताया कि गोलीबारी में एक व्यक्ति की मौत हो गई और दो अन्य लोग घायल हो गए।अधिकारियों ने बताया कि अंतरराष्ट्रीय सीमा के निकट के इलाके पर पहुंच को लेकर स्थानीय लोगों और एपीएफ के बीच टकराव हुआ और बाद में दोनों पक्षों के बीच मारपीट हुई। इसके बाद गोलीबारी की गई। उन्होंने बताया कि स्थानीय पुलिस और एसएसबी के वरिष्ठ अधिकारी घटनास्थल पर हैं।


भारत-नेपाल सीमा पर फायरिंग, SSB के डीजी ने कहा- नेपाल क्षेत्र के अंदर हुई घटना, स्थिति सामान्य



Hindustan is Hindi Daily popular in Bihar.
This is Hindi Belt and Hindi News is popular in UP & Bihar having News Agencies & Journalists.

DG-SSB
Director General of the (DG) Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB)
(BSF / Border Security Force)

Hindustan:
Firing on India-Nepal border, incident happened deep inside Nepalese Territory says SSB-DG
 

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India-Nepal Tension: नेपाल पुलिस की अंधाधुंध फायरिंग में एक भारतीय की मौत, सीमा पर तनाव

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Publish Date:Fri, 12 Jun 2020 06:40 PM (IST)



India-Nepal Tension: नेपाल पुलिस की अंधाधुंध फायरिंग में एक भारतीय की मौत, सीमा पर तनाव



India Nepal Tension भारत-नेपाल के मौजूद तनाव के बीच नेपाल पुलिस द्वारा बिहार सीमा पर की गई अंधाधुंध फायरिंग में एक भारतीय की मौत हो गई है। इससे सीमा पर तनाव बढ़ गया है।

सीतामढ़ी, जेएनएन। India Nepal Tension:

भारत-नेपाल के बीच चल रहे मौजूद तनाव के बीच शुक्रवार सुबह बिहार से लगी सीमा पर नेपाल पुलिस द्वारा भारतीय किसानों पर अंधाधुंध फायरिंग करने का मामला सामने आया है। इस फायरिंग में एक भारतीय की मौत हो गई है, जबकि कुछ लोग घायल हुए हैं। इस घटना के बाद से भारत-नेपाल सीमा पर तनाव बढ़ गया है। दोनों तरफ सुरक्षा बल तैनात कर दिए गए हैं। इस घटना को लेकर SSB के डीजी ने कहा क‍ि घटना नेपाल क्षेत्र के अंदर हुई है अब स्थिति पूरी तरह सामान्य है। उधर, किशनगंज के इलाके में बॉर्डर पर पिछले दिनों फायरिंग हुई थी। फसल कटनी का मामला था।







सीतामढ़ी के विकेश की गई जान
घटना शुक्रवार सुबह करीब 8:30 बजे सोनबरसा थाना क्षेत्र की पीपरा परसाइन पंचायत की लालबंदी जानकीनगर सीमा की है। एपीएफ ने भारतीयों को निशाना बनाते हुए अंधाधुंध फायरिंग की। एपीएफ ने बॉर्डर इलाके से एक व्यक्ति को बंधक भी बना लिया। ग्रामीणों की मानें तो नेपाल की ओर से 18 राउंड फायरिंग की गई। मृतक की पहचान जानकी नगर टोला लालबंदी निवासी नागेश्वर राय के 25 वर्षीय पुत्र विकेश कुमार के रूप में हुई है। वहीं, विनोद राम के पुत्र उमेश राम व सहोरवा निवासी बिंदेश्वर शर्मा के पुत्र उदय शर्मा घायल हैं। बंधक बनाया गया व्यक्ति जानकीनगर का लगन राय है। नेपाल की इस कार्रवाई के बाद बॉर्डर पर तनाव बढ़ गया है। दोनों देशों के अधिकारी बॉर्डर पर पहुंचकर कैंप कर रहे।

सीतामढ़ी के एसपी अनिल कुमार ने घटना की पुष्टि करते हुए बताया कि एपीएफ की कार्रवाई में एक भारतीय की मौत हो गई है। दो लोग जख्मी हुए हैं, जबकि एक को बंधक बना लिया है। तनावपूर्ण माहौल को देखते हुए डीएम अभिलाषा कुमारी शर्मा ने पुलिस व एसएसबी के अधिकारियों को बॉर्डर के हालात पर नजर रखने को कहा है।







यह हुई घटना
बता दें क‍ि अभी भारत-नेपाल बॉर्डर सील है जिससे दोनों देशों के बीच आवाजाही बंद है। इसी बीच बिहार के सीतामढ़ी जिला निवासी लगन राय अपने पुत्र के साथ किसी महिला रिश्तेदार से मिलने बॉर्डर पर गए थे। नेपाल पुलिस उनको बॉर्डर से भगाना चाह रही थी। पिता-पुत्र ने थोड़ी देर की मोहल्लत मांगी तो एपीएफ (नेपाल सशस्त्र प्रहरी बल) ने उनके लड़के पर लाठी चला दी। लगन राय को घसीटते हुए बॉर्डर से सौ मीटर दूर ले गई। उसके बाद उनको बंधक बना लिया।



नेपाल पुलिस का आरोप बंदूक छीनना चाह रहे थे भारतीय
यह देखकर बॉर्डर पर क्रिकेट खेल रहे कुछ युवकों व खेतों में काम कर रहे लोगों ने नेपाल पुलिस की इस कार्रवाई का विरोध करना चाहा। इसी बात पर पुलिस ने फायरिंग शुरू कर दी। हालांकि, नेपाल पुलिस की ओर से यह बात भी सुनने में आ रहा है कि उन लोगों ने अपनी सुरक्षा में फायरिंग की। उनका आरोप है कि भारतीय उनकी बंदूक छीनना चाह रहे थे। नेपाल पुलिस उनको तस्कर भी बता रही है। हालांकि, एक विडियो भी सामने आया है जिसमें नेपाल पुलिस लगन राय के बेटे को पीटती हुई दिख रही है। सीतामढ़ी में हुई इस घटना पर एसएसबी के डीजी कुमार राजेश चंद्र ने कहा है कि यह घटना नेपाल सीमा के काफी अंदर हुई है। उन्होंने कहा है कि स्थिति पूरी तरह सामान्य है।


किशनगंज बॉर्डर पर भी हुई थी फायरिंग: गौरतलब है कि 16 मई की रात को इंडो-नेपाल बॉर्डर पर भारतीय सीमा क्षेत्र के ग्रामीणों के साथ नेपाल आर्म्ड फोर्स के जवानों के साथ तीखी झड़प के बाद माहौल तनावपूर्ण बन गया। दिघलबैंक प्रखंड क्षेत्र अंर्तगत करूवामनी पंचायत के सुरीभिट्ठा गांव के उस पार नेपाल के कुट्टी गांव के समीप रात लगभग 9.30 बजे घटित इस घटना में नेपाल आर्म्ड फोर्स के जवानों के द्वारा हवाई फायरिंग की बात ग्रामीणों द्वारा बताई गई। जिसे लेकर 17 मई को नो मैंस लैंड पर एसएसबी के अधिकारियों, स्थानीय पुलिस पदाधिकारी व नेपाल आर्म्ड फोर्स के अधिकारियों व दोनों देश के जनप्रतिनिधियों ने बैठक कर मामला सुलझा लिया गया। एसएसबी 19 वीं बटालियन के डिप्टी कमांडेंट नवीन कुमार व गंधर्वडांगा थानाध्यक्ष प्रदीप चंद्र ने बताया कि लॉकडाउन के दौरान किसानों को नेपाल सीमा में प्रवेश नहीं करने व फसल को जमींदारों द्वारा कटनी कराने पर सहमति बनी। इस घटना को लेकर दोनों देश के सीमा प्रहरी शांतिपूर्ण तरीके से हल निकालने को लेकर बैठक की।



क्या था मामला :
बॉर्डर पिलर संख्या 125/10 के समीप नेपाल के कचन कबल गांव में भारतीय किसानों द्वारा नेपाल क्षेत्र में ठेका पर लगाए मक्का तोडऩे की कोशिश की गई थी। दर्जनों की संख्या में पहुंचे किसान कचिया जैसे घरेलू हथियार से लैस थे। ड्यूटी पर तैनात नेपाल फोर्स के रोके जाने पर भी ग्रामीण जोर जबरदस्ती करने लगे। जिस पर नेपाल आर्म्ड फोर्स के जवानों ने अपनी आत्मरक्षा के लिए एक हवाई फायरिंग कर दी। गोली चलते ही सभी किसान भाग गए।



India-Nepal Tension: नेपाल पुलिस की अंधाधुंध फायरिंग में एक भारतीय की मौत, सीमा पर तनाव




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कचिया : दाँती । हँसिया ।
कचिया - हिन्दी शब्दकोश में कचिया की परिभाषा और पर्यायवाची

Indian half circular Cutting Knife for crops :


1591991422159.png






Sickle
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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For other uses, see Sickle (disambiguation).
Sickle
Hasiya krish.jpg
Nepalese sickle from Panchkhal
Other namesBagging hook, reaping-hook
ClassificationCutting
RelatedScythe

One of 12 roundels depicting the "Labours of the Months" (1450-1475)
A sickle, bagging hook or reaping-hook, is a single-handed agricultural tool designed with variously curved blades and typically used for harvesting, or reaping, grain crops or cutting succulent forage chiefly for feeding livestock, either freshly cut or dried as hay. Falx was a synonym but was later used to mean any of a number of tools that had a curved blade that was sharp on the inside edge such as a scythe.

Sickle - Wikipedia



Billhook
Billhook - Wikipedia
 

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Nepal passes amendment on new map

Kallol Bhattacharjee

KATHMANDU, JUNE 13, 2020 18:19 IST
UPDATED: JUNE 14, 2020 01:25 IST


People light candles in Kathmandu on June 13, 2020 as they celebrate after the Nepal parliament approved a new national emblem with a new political map that includes territories disputed with India.


People light candles in Kathmandu on June 13, 2020 as they celebrate after the Nepal parliament approved a new national emblem with a new political map that includes territories disputed with India. | Photo Credit: AFP

Unanimous vote by Pratinidhi Sabha gives legal stamp to inclusion of Indian territory.
The Lower House of Nepal's Parliament on Saturday unanimously passed the historic Second Constitution Amendment Bill guaranteeing legal status for the updated political map of Nepal which includes India's territories in Uttarakhand’s Pithoragarh district.
The voting in the Pratinidhi Sabha (House of Representatives) came after day-long discussions, which included praise from co-chair of the Nepal Communist Party Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” for the Nepalese democracy, which, he said, is reversing centuries of diplomatic humiliation.





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Not tenable: India
Responding to the development, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said it had “noted” the legislative process.
“The artificial enlargement of claims is not based on historical fact or evidence and is not tenable. It is also violative of our current understanding to hold talks on outstanding boundary issues,” said MEA spokesperson Anurag Srivastava.
The territorial dispute stems from the fact that Nepal claims the land to the east of river Kali, which forms the country’s western border. As per Kathmandu’s understanding, the river originates from Limpiyadhura in the higher Himalayas, giving it access to a triangular-shaped land defined by Limpiyadhura-Lipulekh and Kalapani. India opposes the notion and says the origin of the river is much further down, which reduces Nepal’s territorial demand.
Saturday’s amendment was approved through a voice vote, following which all the members of the Pratinidhi Sabha gave individual signatures to the Bill which completed the voting process.
The voting showed that members from all the political parties of the Pratinidhi Sabha voted in favour of the motion moved by the government of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli.
Apart from the ruling Nepal Communist Party, the amendment received support of the Nepali Congress and the newly formed Janata Samajvadi Party-Nepal.
Also read | Why are India and Nepal fighting over Kalapani?
The total votes cast in favour were 258 and no one voted against the bill though 11 members remained absent or abstained. It is not clear yet why they did not vote. Four members including Bijaya Kumar Gachchhadar, the leading figure of indigenous Tharu community, have been suspended and could not participate in the proceedings.
“I hearby declare the Second Constitution Amendment passed with two-thirds majority,” Speaker of the Pratinidhi Sabha Agni Sapkota announced amidst celebrations.
Immediately after the passing of the bill, Nepal’s senior officials began sending out social media messages which indicated the diplomatic angle of the territorial dispute.
“The House of Representatives (Pratinidhi Sabha) unanimously adopted the Constitution Amendment Bill, paving the way for accommodating the updated political-administrative map in the national emblem,” said Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali, who also attached an image of the Coat of Arms showing the new map, including Indian territories.

Nepal’s House of Representatives members in Kathmandu on June 13, 2020 gesture as they vote on an amendment to update the national emblem with a new political map.


Nepal’s House of Representatives members in Kathmandu on June 13, 2020 gesture as they vote on an amendment to update the national emblem with a new political map. | Photo Credit: AFP
The concluding session witnessed passionate speeches by the members of the parliament. The most important intervention of the day came from Prachanda, who described the day as a historic moment for Nepal.
“We are working to ensure territorial integrity national sovereignty and freedom of our people. The kings of Nepal lost our territory, but today we republicans are restoring it,” he said to applause from the other members. The unanimous voting was made possible by the cross party support ensured by Mr Oli's government.


Nepal unveiled the new map on May 20 after Defence Minister Rajnath Singh inaugurated Darchula-Lipulekh link road on May 8. Nepal had earlier strongly protested when the updated Indian map published in November last year showed the region as part of Uttarakhand.
Nepal claims right to the region and says India was allowed to station troops there in the 1950s and that Delhi has refused to remove forces from the region ever since. Nepal’s Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Shiva Maya Tumbahangphe tabled the amendment bill on May 31 and the necessary month long discussion was fast tracked.
During the debates, Prime Minister Oli, Foreign Minister Gyawali, Nepali Congress leader Sher Bahadur Deuba and Madhesi leaders like Mahanta Thakur and Rajendra Mahato addressed the house.
The diplomatic fallout of the territorial dispute, is likely to be serious, said former foreign minister and Nepalese commentator Ramesh Nath Pandey, who warned of difficult days ahead for Nepal-India relations as well as for South Asian region.
“Now, Indo-Nepal border negotiations will be all the more complicated as secretaries have no right to negotiate on the provisions of our Constitution,” said Mr. Pandey. He argued that the territorial dispute of Kalapani, Limpiyadhura and Lipulekh cannot be resolved at talks led by Foreign Secretaries or senior envoys as the disputed territories are now part of Nepal’s constitution and public imagination.



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The Indian checkposts, Lipu Lekh, and Kalapani


SAM COWAN • December 14, 2015


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In his book Border Management of Nepal, Buddhi Narayan Shrestha states that “Indian Armed military-men of the Indian Military Check-posts, deputed on 9 June 1952 in the northern frontier of Nepal, were put away and sent back to India by the Government of Nepal on 20 April 1969” (259). This article examines the political and security contexts that led to the deployment of these foreign soldiers and police officers on Nepali soil. It will include detail about the checkposts given in the accounts of early foreign travelers who encountered them in various remote places. The vexed disputes between Nepal and India over Lipu Lekh and Kalapani will also be examined. The great scoop comes at the end.

Buddhi Narayan Shrestha’s dates for the deployment and withdrawal of the checkposts need treating with care. We can be more certain about the withdrawal timescale because of detail given in Rishikesh Shaha’s book Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect. It gives extracts of an exclusive interview that Nepal’s then prime minister, Kirti Nidhi Bista, gave to the official English language daily, The Rising Nepal, on June 25, 1969. In it he stated, no doubt at the behest of King Mahendra, that since India had not consulted Nepal either at the time of the 1962 Sino-Indian armed conflict or during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, the commitments with regard to mutual security based on the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship had fallen into disuse and by the same token were no longer binding on either party (Shaha, 130). He expressed Nepal’s resentment of the term “special relationship” and stressed that “Nepal could not compromise its sovereignty for India’s so called security.” A specific demand was made for “the immediate withdrawal both of the Indian ‘wireless operators’ from the checkposts on the Nepal-China border and of the Indian Military Liaison Group.” The Indian Ministry of External Affairs initially pretended not to take notice of this interview, with a spokesman inviting a formal communication from the Government of Nepal on the subject. Eventually after much diplomatic sparring, during which India threatened to close the border, an agreement was reached in September 1969 to withdraw the checkposts by August 1970. Significantly, Nepal did not insist on scrapping the 1950 treaty.

A well-sourced and widely carried Associated Press report from Delhi, dated December 29, 1969, confirms that that the agreement to withdraw the checkposts was generally adhered to. The report states correctly that the Indians were stunned to get the request to remove the 17 checkposts, but that seven posts were evacuated in December 1969 and that “the evacuation of nine remaining border watchposts” would take place during 1970. (One checkpost may have been withdrawn earlier and although most sources refer to 18 checkposts, it is possible that one initially planned was not deployed, though there are some indications that at one stage the number might have gone up to 20.)

The deployment dates of the checkposts are more problematic. Buddhi Narayan Shrestha states, “This happened during the premiership of Matrika Prasad Koirala, beginning 9 June 1952, at 18 checkposts of the Nepalese frontier. In each of these checkposts, 20 to 40 Indian army personnel equipped with arms and communication equipment were deployed, together with a few Nepali army and civilian officials. The Indian army deployment was completed in two trips to Nepal” (51). Buddhi Narayan Shrestha gives no reference to support his statement on the composition of the checkposts or the June 9, 1952 deployment date. He is also vague about the specific authorization for the deployment of the checkposts, linking it simply to the well-known letter of Sardar Patel to Nehru of November 7, 1950. Patel was the Indian home minister at the time. He was a charismatic and powerful character who played a leading role in the fight for Indian independence. In 1946, at the request of Gandhi, he stood aside to allow Nehru to be elected Congress president and hence, on August 15, 1947, to become the first prime minister of an independent India. He died on December 15, 1950 and knew that he was terminally ill when he wrote his impressive and comprehensive letter. It was aimed at alerting Nehru to the new military threat facing India following the Chinese Army’s incursion into Tibet and to stress to him the need for India to take immediate wide-ranging actions to counter it, including in Nepal.
No separate secret protocol authorized the deployment of the checkposts, but Clause 1 of the secret exchange of letters attached to the 1950 treaty (made public in 1959) did state that “neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat, the two governments shall consult with each other and advise effective counter-measures.” That was a convenient cover, retrospectively applied I believe, for India’s actions. Many years ago I asked a retired senior Royal Nepal Army officer about the subject. He simply said that the Indians just did it and there was nothing Nepal could do about it. Research indicates that this was an accurate assessment. The prevailing political and security contexts help to explain how such a state of affairs existed.


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The Indian checkposts, Lipu Lekh, and Kalapani



In the area of politics, an agreement brokered by India in Delhi on February 8, 1951 effectively ended 104 years of Rana rule. King Tribhuvan and his family returned in triumph from their three-month exile on February 15, 1951. The last Rana maharaja, Mohan Shumsher, remained as prime minister of an interim administration until November 12, 1951. Matrika Prasad Koirala of the Nepal Congress party was prime minster from November 16, 1951 until August 14, 1952, after which King Tribhuvan introduced a period of direct rule, which lasted until June 15, 1953 when M. P. Koirala again took over as prime minister. It is well documented that in the build-up to this historic change, and through the years that followed, India’s influence over those running Nepal was very strong. One respected source says: “So marked was the growth of Indian influence during this period that at times it came close to total political and economic domination.” (From People Politics and Ideology, Democracy and Social Change in Nepal, Hoftun, Raeper and Whelpton, 27.)




The Indian ambassador from 1949 to 1952, C. P. N. Singh, played a key part in the 1950 revolution, and his meddling in the affairs of the Nepali Congress party and in the shaping of Nepali government policy was notorious. Stories about his activities abound, but during a recent visit to the National Archives in London I unearthed this, new to me, account of how he saw his role and justified his actions. In a dispatch to London dated March 1, 1951, the British ambassador reported that the previous evening he had held a reception for the new Council of Ministers during which Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher had told a guest that he recently told C. P. N Singh that he had information that Singh had obtained direct telephone connections to King Tribhuvan and B. P. Koirala, the leader of the Nepali Congress party. He had asked him if he thought that such direct contact was consistent with normal relations of a foreign representative. C. P. N. Singh had replied that it was not consistent with normal relations of a foreign representative, but his position as India’s representative in Nepal was not normal. The last sentence in the dispatch stated: “An Indian on friendly terms with the Congress leaders told me yesterday that it was they who asked Nehru to appoint C. P. N. Singh as Ambassador to Nepal in August 1949 and it was through him that funds were sent to Congress followers in Kathmandu.”

King Tribhuvan himself was very active in seeking Indian guidance. In his annual report for 1952, the British ambassador wrote that “the King of Nepal was in India when the year opened and again at its close. As also on four other occasions in between, and this was an indication of his dependence there.” Later in the report, referring to a dip in Tribhuvan’s popularity, which had peaked when the Rana regime ended, he wrote: “There is also a wide suspicion that he has no deep patriotism and his frequent trips to India for rather undignified relaxation do not help.”

In Nepal: Strategy for Survival, Leo Rose sums up Nepal’s willingness to accede to India’s demands in an appropriately stark way: “New Delhi’s concept of Nepal’s interests was accepted almost automatically in Kathmandu, at least at the official level. Indeed, it is probable that some Nepali leaders tended to be over-responsive in this respect, interpreting even casual suggestions by the Indians as advice to be acted on. . . . On a number of occasions, the Nepal government not only tamely followed New Delhi’s guidance but actually took the initiative in seeking it. That the Indians began to take Kathmandu too much for granted and tended to act in a rather cavalier and condescending fashion with regard to their own prerogatives, is therefore hardly surprising” (195).

This political reality was directly linked to India’s perceived security needs. In a speech to the Indian Parliament on December 6, 1950, Nehru made the position very clear: “Now we have had from immemorial times a magnificent frontier, that is to say the Himalayas. . . . Now so far as the Himalayas are concerned, they lie on the other side of Nepal. . . . Therefore as much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot risk our own security by anything going wrong in Nepal which either permits that barrier to be crossed or otherwise weakens our frontier.” Nehru’s feelings about the Himalayas, bordering on the romantic, played a significant role in shaping Indian policy, right up to the start of the Sino-Indian 1962 War. These phrases, extracted from the opening lines of a speech he gave in Kathmandu on June 16, 1951, at the conclusion of his first visit, exemplify this: “Mountain-girt Nepal, daughter of the Himalayas, young sister of India, I have come here at last. . . . I am a child of the mountains myself, the mountains of the far north. . . . The Himalayas are the guardians and sentinels of India and Nepal . . . the fate of India and Nepal is linked closely together . . . it is particularly necessary that we hold together.”






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How these political and security conditions directly led to India’s decision to deploy the checkposts on the northern frontier of Nepal is well explained in a book written by B. N. Mullik, the all-powerful head of India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), called My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal. Early in Chapter 6, under the heading “New Security Problems,” Mullik writes that that the IB had no doubts about Chinese intentions: that it would soon militarily overrun the whole of Tibet and close up to the borders of India. In August 1950, the IB submitted a detailed proposal recommending the establishment of twenty-one checkposts to guard the passes on the Indo-Tibetan frontier “from Ladakh in the north-western extremity to the Lohit Division in the north-east.” On November 3, 1950, the IB produced a long note describing the new problems of frontier security that would result, and making comprehensive recommendations. This is a prelude to Mullik asserting that Sardar Patel accepted these suggestions and acted quickly by producing his long letter of November 7, 1950 to Nehru. The letter referred to the IB note and made a number of other recommendations. Mullik reproduces the Sardar Patel letter in full, which tells Nehru that “we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we know it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates.” Key extracts from Sardar Patel’s letter pertinent to this article are:




“4. Let me consider the political consideration on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas of Assam. From the point of view of communications they are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost unlimited scope for infiltration. . . . Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force; it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. . . . In my judgment, therefore, the situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also the methods by which we would achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policy to attain these objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.

“6. It is, of course, impossible for me to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems, which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them:

[f] The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontiers. This would include the whole of the border, i.e. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the Tribal Territory in Assam.

[h] Improvement of our communications, road, rail, air and wireless in these areas, and with our frontier outposts.

Policing and intelligence of frontier posts.”

Mullik writes that as result of this letter and the IB note, among other measures, a high-powered committee presided over by Major-General Himmat Singhji was formed to make recommendations “about measures that should be taken to improve administration, defence, communications, etc. of all the frontier areas.” The relevant lines for checkposts in Nepal appear in the last paragraph of the chapter: “Earlier when the scheme for frontier checkposts had been accepted, we had also impressed on the Government that no security measures for northern India could be anything near perfect unless the passes between Tibet on one side and Bhutan and Nepal on the other were properly guarded. The working out of a scheme, so far as Bhutan was concerned, was left to the Political Officer, Gangtok, but for one reason or the other this did not materialise for nearly a decade. But, after consulting our Ambassador in Nepal, a Deputy Director from the IB, Warriam Singh, was sent to Nepal and he had a very fruitful discussion with the Maharajah, who was then the Prime Minister. The Maharajah took some time to consider the offer made by us to assist Nepal to open checkposts on the Nepal-Tibet frontier. These checkposts were subsequently opened and manned jointly by Indian and Nepali staff. The number of posts was further increased and the staff expanded at the time of the Koirala Government.” (Emphasis added.)

Further helpful indications are given in Chapter 7 of Mullik’s book, “The Quest for Security.” The Himmat Singhji committee (also called the North and North-East Border Defence Committee) reported in two parts with the second part containing recommendations on Ladakh and the frontier regions of Himal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Nepal being submitted in September 1951. Mullik writes, “Actually the second part was held up to receive the recommendations of another committee headed by Major-General Thorat, which had been set up to assess the security needs of Nepal and its requirements for Indian assistance—and this latter committee submitted its report in August, 1951.” Two pages later, this committee is given another mention: “With regard to Nepal, on the basis of the Thorat Committee’s recommendations, this Committee also recommended that the Nepal government should be persuaded to survey the frontier and passes, establish checkposts where necessary, extend effective control to the remote areas, improve the road system and reorganise the Nepalese army on modern lines.” Mullik published his book in 1971 and his reference to “persuading” the Nepali government may have been an attempt to avoid touching on Nepali sensitivities. Starting with the tone of the Sardar Patel letter, India’s assertiveness and determination is clear, as is the mass of evidence pointing to Kathmandu’s willingness to respond with alacrity to any suggestion from Delhi. The point is made because another source states that Thorat recommended that the Government of India should carry out the land reconnaissance of 16 passes as a high priority (Mutual Security: The Case of India-Nepal, Sangeeta Thapliyal, 50).






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This résumé of Indian decision-making puts a question mark over Buddhi Narayan Shrestha’s claim that the checkposts were deployed “during the premiership of Matrika Prasad Koirala, beginning 9 June 1952.” As maharaja, Mohan Shumsher was prime minister up to February 18, 1951, and, following Tribhuvan’s return from Delhi, he retained the appointment as head of the interim Rana and Nepali Congress government up to November 16, 1951, when he was succeeded by M. P. Koirala. Other evidence suggests that the first deployments could have taken place as early as late 1951, and subsequent deployments took place, as Buddhi Narayan Shrestha indicates, over a number of years.




In his book, Buddhi Narayan Shrestha gives the location of the checkposts by name and district as follows:

Indian Military Check-posts on the Northern Frontier of Nepal (Deployed from 1952 to 1969)

Check-post District

1. Tinkar Pass Darchula
2. Taklakot Bajhang
3. Muchu Humla
4. Mugugaon Mugu
5. Chharkabhot Dolpa
6. Kaisang (Chhusang) Mustang
7. Thorang Manang
8. Larkay Pass Gorkha
9. Atharasaya Khola Gorkha
10. Somdang Rasuwa
11. Rasuwagadhi Rasuwa
12. Tatopani (Kodari) Sindhupalchok
13. Lambagar Dolakha
14. Namche (Chyalsa) Solukhumbu
15. Chepuwa Pass Sankhuwasabha
16. Olangchungola Taplejung
17. Thaychammu Taplejung
18. Chyangthapu Panchthar

(Shrestha, 259)

The name given to some of the checkposts is confusing. The one in Bajhang was located north of Chainpur to cover the historic trade route to Taklakot over the pass at Urai Lekh. The checkpoints were located from one to five days’ walk from the frontier. Given that they were in position throughout the year, survival was a major determinant of the exact place chosen. For example, the Larkye Pass was covered by a detachment at Setibas, some five days walk from the frontier. The accounts of the foreign travelers who encountered these checkposts indicate that at different times the checkpoints were occupied by Indian Army soldiers or Indian police officers or a mix of both. Perhaps early on it was more army with police taking over in the later stages. A Royal Nepal Army security presence was invariably located close by. The detachments reported by radio to a base station in the Indian embassy in Kathmandu, which had a small police presence dedicated to the task of command and control. Initially the police section in the embassy was headed by a superintendent of police. Over time this was upgraded first to deputy inspector and later to inspector general rank. Most of the checkposts were engaged in asking locals who crossed into Tibet for trade or for work to gather information on troop deployments, road construction, and the economic state of the local population. They also attempted to recruit locals from across the border to act as informers. No doubt China was in the same game.

Given that India was making all the decisions on these checkposts and the passes they should cover, Lipu Lekh’s absence from the list is striking and revealing. Before plunging into such deep waters, it is useful to follow the military principle of first assessing the ground or geography before anything else. Google Earth is a useful guide, but so also are the blogs and photographs of the Indian pilgrims who have followed the officially approved route (by India and China) over Lipu Lekh to travel to Manasarovar and Kailash. This account offers a good example.






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